Presentation
Decision Procedures for Artificial Moral Agents
DescriptionWhenever one considers the possibility of designing ethical artificial intelligence (AI), it is tempting to think that the success of such a project would depend on whether systems could be built to implement the same kinds of ethical decision-making procedures as the ones we regard as appropriate for humans. This paper calls into question the foregoing line of thought. It argues that (i) the appropriateness of a decision procedure for a given moral agent depends on the nature of the agent’s capacities; (ii) AIs and humans possess capacities that differ in their nature; and (iii) if (i) and (ii), then the appropriate decision procedures for AIs are different from the ones that are appropriate for humans. The temptation to design ethical AI that employs the same decision procedures as humans should be resisted, lest we miss out on the benefits that could be gained from AI that utilizes distinct procedures.